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STAYING POWER

by VERNON BARTLETT

You will, we hope and believe, like *World Review* in its new form. You ought to, even if you fail to do so. The convenience of size is obvious —the only advantage possessed by the larger format was that it provided a more convenient block on which to scribble your letters. But there are other conveniences as well. The new type is smaller, but as clear as its predecessor. By using it we can give you just as much reading matter, and yet use barely more than half the paper we formerly used. Wide margins come in pleasantly for shopping lists, addresses and telephone numbers, but they waste a material which has to be imported from abroad and which can no longer reach us from the Scandinavian countries.

There have been many casualties among periodicals since the war began. *World Review* was very nearly among them, as you might expect, since so large a section of its contents consisted of extracts from the foreign Press, and foreign papers became so difficult and expensive to obtain. But thanks to the fidelity of our

readers, we have survived, and can now change to what should prove to be a much more popular format. But we want new subscribers and new advertisements. Please remember that, if you feel, as we feel, that in war-time it is important to replace by the printed word those contacts with people and ideas in foreign lands which can no longer be maintained by travel.

Federal Union

We explained last month that our official contact with the Federal Union Club had come to an end. It is essential to encourage as many people as possible to discuss how we can build up a better and more sensible world when the present struggle is over. This we shall, of course, continue to do. But so many people are "for" or "against" Federal Union, and we who hold that no man can yet affirm that one machine or another will best replace war have no desire to be mixed up in controversy of that kind when there is still so much to be done in convincing other people that war in future can be avoided at all. We hope, however, to print at least one article a month on the subject of international federation.

And now to other matters. It is futile, as I am frequently reminded to my cost, to comment on the day's news in a monthly review. "That man" is determined to end the war this year, and he must act with a rapidity which takes no account of editorial difficulties. Since I wrote my last article for this review, a promising situation in Norway, due to the fact that Hitler had attacked the one country where the British Navy might have played the decisive part, has degenerated into a serious defeat owing to the hesitations of the Government's naval advisers. A Government has been driven out of office after one of the most dramatic sessions ever known in the House of Commons. Hitler has invaded two more countries whose governments, like Mr. Chamberlain at Munich, had gone to the farthest limit of conciliation in the hope of keeping out of war. A great struggle has begun along that frontier between the Western and Eastern Franks which was to be settled once and for all time by the Treaty of Verdun, concluded more than a thousand years

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ago. How can one hope to keep pace with history written at that speed?

Wars are decided not only by battles. There are many imponderables too drab and dull to catch the attention which have more to do with the result than the triumphant advance of an army corps. In the speech which lost him the Premiership, on account of its incredible complacency, Mr. Chamberlain tried to argue that the balance of the Norwegian campaign was in our

"Something is rotten in the State of Denmark."

"Chicago Daily Times"

favour. It is, of course, nothing of the sort, for Germany will have about one thousand miles of submarine bases and several new airfields from which she could easily bombard not only the East Coast, but even the Clyde. She has, I believe, been building a large number of small submarines to hamper shipping round our coasts, although she is very short of crews to man them. Swedish iron can no longer reach us, and our trade with the Scandinavian countries (including Finland), which in 1938 was larger than our trade with France, Germany and Russia put together, has come completely to an end. The great question now is : Who blockades whom?

But there is a great deal to place against these military successes. To some extent the Austrians, and to a very great extent indeed the Czechoslovaks, the Poles, the Danes, the Norwegians, and some Dutch, Belgians and Germans, have little thought but the destruction of the whole Nazi System. The more they have to produce by way of food or munitions to strengthen the Nazi attack upon us, the more surely they become our secret allies, waiting for the first opportunity to intervene. In the last war the German High Command won almost every battle, and yet was defeated because it had left out of account the staying power of the people at home. Too late it learnt, or had the chance of learning, the value of a sense of proportion. And in this war it is increasing the number of its potential enemies with a recklessness which is frightening to those of us who would want to see a peace treaty prompted by reason and not by violent passion.

There can now be no doubt whatsoever about the attitude of the United States. The uninspiring leadership of the Chamberlain Government and the undying resentment of the Irish had between them very nearly cancelled out American dislike of Nazi methods and the sense of relationship with the British, which is always an important factor in Anglo-American relations as long as the British themselves don't talk about it. The Soviet attack on Finland helped the Allied cause, since Russia and Germany had so

recently combined to divide Poland. The Nazi attack on Denmark and Norway helped that cause still more, since so many of the most respected elements in the United States are Scandinavian. The Nazi invasion of Holland and Belgium has left no shadow of doubt even in Middle Western minds (much more alert, incidentally, than is often realised) that this is a struggle between Adolf Hitler and civilisation. How active American support of the Allies will be one cannot yet tell, but neutrality, in its strict European sense, is a word that has passed out of usage.

Then there is the attitude of the Vatican. The Pope and President Roosevelt are the two most influential men in the world to-day on the side of sanity, and it is a matter for thankfulness that Vatican City occupies a minute enclave in Italian territory. Quite possibly by the time this article appears Signor Mussolini will have led, or misled, his people into war. An Allied victory, even were

"Le Canard Enchainé," Pari

TOURISTS

"We'd like a game of croquet: isn't there an aerodrome in this district?"

it accompanied by all sorts of concessions and promises to Italy, could only add to the instability of the Duce's regime. It would let loose democratic demands which he could not grant. Economically the war is not bringing that wealth to Italy which came to the neutrals in the last war, and if Hitler decides that Italy is more useful to him as a belligerent than a "non-belligerent," it is difficult to believe that Mussolini will send him about his business.

But all the instincts of the Italian people are against intervention on the side of the Germans, who were so recently turned out of the northern provinces in order that Italy might become a united nation. Propaganda can perform unpleasant miracles in totalitarian States, and the Italian people would obey the Duce's command with every appearance of enthusiasm. But the *Osservatore Romano,* the Vatican daily paper, has gained a large circulation outside Vatican circles by printing news that no ordinary Italian paper would dare to print. The Pope's obvious detestation of Nazi precepts and practices will weaken any Italian war effort very much indeed. To that weakness must now be added another one—the King of Italy is said to be still bitter against the Allies because they did not give Italy greater prizes after the last war, but he, too, does not wish his country to be plunged into a struggle in which she would be one of the principal sufferers. He must wish it all the less now that the brother of his daughter-in-law, King Leopold of Belgium, is one more victim of Nazi aggression.

* * * *

Some of us have, through weary months, criticised the British Government for the inadequacy of its war effort. That criticism recently led to the most remarkable and dramatic session the House of Commons has known for many years. None of us who were there will soon forget the effectiveness of the speech by Sir Roger Keyes, read out nervously sentence by sentence, and yet, coming from a man with six rows of medal ribbons on his uniform, containing criticisms so telling in their condemnation of the dithering and hesitation during the first

few hours of the Norwegian invasion that the Chamberlain Government could hardly hope to survive. Or Mr. Lloyd George's final sentence in which he demanded that the Prime Minister should display his own spirit of self-sacrifice by handing over the seals of office. Or the efforts made by the Chief Whip's office to kill the debate and to silence the rebels. Or the fact that almost everybody in uniform trooped into the lobby to vote against the Government. The way in which Mr. Chamberlain was booed out of the House after the result of the vote had been announced was shameful, but on the whole the debate was the most impressive vindication of the democratic system I have yet witnessed. In Great Britain popular indignation can still dismiss a Government allegedly supported by an overwhelming parliamentary majority, and before this war is over millions of Germans will envy us on that account.

The opportunity of learning to what extent our criticisms of the rate of war production were justified has been thrust upon us with the utmost brutality by Adolf Hitler. There are dangerous and tragic months to be faced. But we are at any rate fortunate in that, at so early a stage of the war, we have representatives in the Government of every great section of public opinion. We are destined, I fear, to pay very heavily for allowing Germany to gain the airfields and deep fiords of Norway. But that campaign and the parliamentary crisis to which it led have put men who are trusted by the mass of British workers in control of the departments that deal most directly with the production of war supplies. The nation is much more nearly united to-day than one had dared to hope a month ago. And among the imponderables that will ultimately defeat Hitler, that is one of the most important.

FEDERAL EUROPE

The Economic Problems

by BARBARA WOOTTON

WRITING about the economic problems of federation in general is rather like discussing where to go for a holiday when the armistice is signed. Since everything depends upon who federates with whom, in what circumstances and when, the whole discussion is unavoidably hypothetical, and every answer is a series of "ifs." In these conditions there are two alternatives. One is to prepare detailed plans on given assumptions as to the character and extent of the proposed federation, e.g. plans for Anglo - French Union. The other is to list the problems which are quite certain to arise in any and every case, to sketch alternative solutions suitable for alternative conditions, and to make excursions into the realm of exciting possibilities. Both jobs are important; but I can touch here only upon the second.

It seems now to be generally agreed that any federation would have to concern itself with at least the three fields of currency, trade restrictions and migration. It is important to be clear why it is these three subjects that have established themselves as the federal trinity. In the judgment of many federalists, the reason is not that the existence of national monetary systems, tariffs and quotas upon the passage of both goods and persons is the sole fence which keeps us out of a Paradise of prosperity. It is simply that monetary, trade and migration policies are peculiarly the instruments of economic nationalism, and that they are also the distinguishing sign of sovereign national, as distinct from other, frontiers. Within a single State, internal frontiers (inter - state or inter-municipal) may mark differences in the school-leaving age, in the right to consume alcohol, or in the law about car licences. But, with very few exceptions, it is only at national

frontiers that you must change your money, produce your passport and pay for dutiable goods.

It is on this account that it is reasonable to hope that any federation would *eventually* abolish internal tariffs and restrictions upon migration, and establish a common money. The speed with which this could be accomplished depends entirely on what kind of federation is envisaged. A



"Il Travaso," Rome

IN THE YEAR 2000

"And that's an ancestor who fought in the economic war."

union that ranged from the United States at one end to, say, India at the other, with most of Europe thrown in between, would have to wait a long time. At the other end of the scale, the problems of an Anglo-French or Anglo-Scandinavian Union would not be nearly so overwhelming. The general principle here is that the more trade is complementary rather than competitive, the quicker can we hope to travel.

As regards migration, the only rule is that the less migration is in fact likely to happen, the safer it is to remove restrictions! Actually, apart from political refugees, the currents of migration have been so effectively stopped by the restriction of the inter-war period that it is very difficult to guess where and how much people would move if they were allowed to go where they pleased. There is hardly a State in the world which now admits even a tenth of the stream of migrants that went to the United States alone in the first decade of the century.

As regards currency, the dominating influence is likely to be the extent to which States are combined in one federation whose economic systems represent very widely different stages of economic planning. In a federation the member-States of which were all highly planned or, alternatively, all relatively free markets, the technical obstacles to establishing a common currency and the dislocations involved would not be alarming. But if there is to be freedom for extensive economic experimentation on the part of individual States, particularly for experiments in collectivism, then independent currencies, exchanging at rates to be federally determined from time to time, would need to be continued considerably longer. This might be an important point in the event of Germany becoming a member of a European Federation after the end of the war.

Whatever the duration of the transition period, it is quite essential that all surviving restrictions on inter-State trade, as well as the determination of exchange rates, should be a federal matter right from the beginning. We may envisage Federal Trade, Migration and Currency Commissions somewhat on the model of the U.S.

Federal Trade Commission.

All this runs counter to Streit's view that national currencies should be abolished, and that all trade and migration barriers should collapse like the walls of Jericho when the trumpets proclaim the foundation of the Union. Streit seems to me to go wrong here on two counts. First, he enormously underestimates the dislocation which such a drastic change would cause, and overestimates the speed with which modern economic systems can recover from shocks. Second, he appears to believe (in the teeth of more than a century's evidence) that, when these barriers are down, everything else can be left to look after itself.

Actually, this is just the point at which the serious economic responsibilities of the Federation, and its great opportunities, would begin. If the Federal authority does not undertake positive economic functions, its political security will be weakened and its possible contribution to economic welfare grossly impoverished. Those positive functions really demand at least an article to themselves. Here only illustrations of what they might include can be given. Such are: Federal establishment of minimum standards in the social services: Federal subsidies to industries or services of special social importance within particular States, and to relatively backward or depressed areas: Federal public works and public utilities (in Europe, in particular, federal power schemes): and federal intrusion into (or, better still, substitution for) existing international controls over commodity production such as those concerned with tin, rubber, tea and wheat.

ITALY CHALLENGES

From "Il Resto del Carlino," Bologna, 20.4.40

THE well-known band of drum and fife players attached to the servile Press on both sides of the English Channel is setting its orchestra going to accuse Italy of equivocation. It was enough that the Italian Press should have said how things were going up there in Norway, checking in timely fashion the avalanche of lies and puerilities produced by the Franco-English "factories" for the most childish and fantastic rumours to be suddenly spread concerning us.

Wherein lies the equivocation? In revealing the truth on the operations in Norway, as the Italian Press has done; or by inventing victories which do not exist and battles which were never fought?

But what is it that causes the most disturbance in high Allied circles: the unabated independence of our judgments and of our sources of information, or is it the manifestation — significant but certainly not surprising — of our solidarity with Germany?

At this point it will do no harm to proceed didactically, in an elementary way. Question: What is Italy's diplomatic position? Documents are available. Italy is the ally of Hitler's Germany. This is not an alliance "on paper"; not an alliance which can be bartered away at the critical moment; nor is it, finally, an alliance of protocols between two Cabinets, self-centred and precariously situated.

The Italo-German alliance is an expression, a quintessence, in a diplomatic instrument of an interdependence of interests, of an historical necessity for expansion, of a consonance of idealistic and political aspirations. It expresses the moral and ideological solidarity of two great revolutions established by plebiscites, fostered and guided by two exceptional *condottieri*, coming from and trusted by the people: Mussolini and Hitler.

The meeting between Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany—and the acts which set

a solemn seal on political and military collaboration — indicate quite clearly Europe's new march towards complete renewal, not only by making *tabula rasa* of the last surviving scaffoldings of Versailles, but also as a result of the disappearance of all plutocratic egoism, which places in the hands of the few the riches of all.

The lessons of eight months of a war of positions have already provided us with ample information as to the new methods of the well-fed gentlemen in the West: to fight by taking away each day a piece of bread from one's enemy, by blocking each day a new line of supplies, depriving him each day of goods or of a market—the war, in short, of a greedy and lazy usurer, a war of siege, of blockade, of starvation, of exhaustion, always best loved by those who are rolling in money and are afraid of risks. Such a conception of war could not be accepted by Hitler—the exponent of a great movement of rebirth and reconstruction—who, as soon as the Anglo-French gave him the chance by sowing Norwegian territorial waters with mines, gave way to the impatience of his intrepid forces, thrusting their might on Norway. From a war conducted with a medicine dropper, we have passed to a mobile war, to the war of all times and all climates, to the war of surprises and dramatic events, in which strategy often upsets what has been imposed by tactics.

For this kind of swift and daring warfare, in which all is staked for all with supreme audacity, Hitler's armed forces are better trained than the Franco-British; for there is an abyss between the unified command in war-time of a totalitarian country and the atomisation of power, of rank and of function in democratic countries, where even war is the subject of oratorical exercises in parliaments! Nor is this the least important reason for the open sympathy of the Italian fighting forces and people for the fighting forces and people of Germany. One of the causes which attract and bind us to Germany is the spiritual and material identity of mutual national necessities even in war, necessities which have their foundation in the political structure, in the nature of

the economic systems, in considerations of a geographical nature and, in the highest degree, in the imperative need, unalienable for both, to possess a *Lebensraum* commensurate with our increasing exigencies.

Our solidarity with Germany therefore is not born, as the Western scribes chant monotonously, of a bureaucratic Press agreement, but has a far deeper, far more solid origin; this convergence of views springs from the polemical position of the two revolutionary States, face to face with the old European world, in which everything is decided by the English, whom Shaw has exposed with the following dictum: "Impermeable to reality; terrorised by the truth."

Where, pray, is Italy's equivocation? If the Italian Press is not affected by the din of Franco-English propaganda, and steadily illuminates with fidelity and honesty the developments of the war, pointing out the enormous worry it is causing proud Albion — is this equivocation? If Italy will not tolerate the incurable presumption of the French and revolts against British arrogance, does this mean maintaining an ambiguous attitude? If Italian newspapers — armed with the robust spirit of Fascism, that is, of cold and analytical reasoning — do not mince matters in illustrating the "worthy achievements" of Messrs. "England and Co.," who dominate peoples, subvert morality and deify mammon, is there in this the shadow of "equivocation"?

Is it still a novelty for Englishmen and Frenchmen that the Italy of Mussolini no longer responds either to sickening (and false) blandishments or to intimidation from wherever it may come? The time has come to revise ideas about Italy — that is urgently necessary; it is no use "sending to Italy an ambassador who is *persona grata* with the Duce." With all due respect for ambassadors and their innate virtue of bearing insults in silence, neither one nor a hundred of them can stop the fateful developments of history.

The plutocratic powers now realise that the Italian nation is "proud and sensitive"; they admit now that there exist "wrongs insufficiently righted"; they advise at this moment from

their sanctionist pulpits that one should be "discerning and full of regard" towards Italy.

Wasted breath. Time presses. The hour is about to witness the final winding-up of all the systems of international oppression, of the so-called "supremacies."

Those who serenade us to-day while they are in trouble are the same as those who denied us a piece of land in Abyssinia for our unemployed labourers. Those who flatter us to-day—in the storm unleashed by Germany's war — are the same as those who, if they were to win, would continue — as they did yesterday, as they have always done—to wish to treat us as vassals, denying us even the right to live by perpetuating that which — as an absolute minimum—all Italians expect to see destroyed by this war, that is, the Mediterranean prison. Seen in this light, Italy's position at Germany's side is the logical consequence of its political thought; a geographical necessity which cannot be deferred. What we shall do is nothing but the natural development of our destiny—is simply our duty as a great power which must turn to the sea for everything.



"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris

"Who are we taking these military measures against?"
"The hereditary enemy."
"Which one?"
"The Council is just deciding that."

Let the enemies of Italy be certain of one thing, and that is that the Italian people is, and will be, in the face of any risk, an unbreakable heroic block surrounding its great Duce.

DISUNITY AMONG ITALIANS

From the Rome Correspondent of "Die Weltwoche," Zürich

THE extraordinarily vehement language which the Italian Press began to use some time ago against the Western Powers came as a surprise to many. Equally unexpected were the reports of demonstrations by students, directed against the diplomatic representatives of England in Florence, Milan and Rome, which have since been denied. The idea, grown into a cliché, of a happy Italy, flourishing and enriching herself while other countries are at war, was widely prevalent abroad.

The reality is somewhat different. It is true that there are extensive circles in Italy which profit by the war. The shipping interests belong to these circles. Italian ships, almost without competition, are not only able greatly to increase their charges for cargo and passengers—most of which are still being paid for in foreign currency—but they also enjoy the advantage of being able to make permanent use of their full capacity.

To the war profiteers in Italy some big industries also belong. But here the picture is no longer quite so cloudless as with shipping. For the very industries who could make the most profit are those who depend most on imports. Italy now possesses neither overmuch iron nor overmuch coal. Therefore, in exceptional times such as the present, her supply of industrial raw materials is at once made difficult.

But besides the industries which, in spite of obstacles, manage to make profits, there are also large and important industrial groups which are suffering severely from the war. To them belongs, above all, foreign trade, so important for the acquisition of credits. Those sections of the popula-

tion in Italy who have to suffer from rising prices constitute the majority of the people.

For all these reasons nothing would be more untrue than to try to imagine the Italians simply as a happy-go-lucky nation of war profiteers. Rather can the general feeling, if a definition must be found for it, be described by the word "*malaise.*" This "*malaise*" shows itself in a universal mistrust of the belligerents. When one says that the Germans are not popular in Italy, that statement is certainly true for large sections of the people. But much the same may be said with regard to the English.

Italy feels that she lives in a world from which she does not obtain her due. Those who are susceptible to propaganda define this injustice by the slogan "The have and the have-not nations." The average Italian, however, is satisfied with a vague sense of suspicion about all countries.

Certainly this feeling provides a not unfavourable basis for a campaign of war propaganda. But, on the other hand, such propaganda is also quite contrary to the fact that the Italian is far too realistic to wish to jeopardise by war what he already possesses.

But obviously a nation's will for peace is not enough to make peace a reality. It cannot be denied that in Italian Government circles there is strong resentment against the Western Powers. Sanctions during the Abyssinian war have still not been forgotten, and they are not forgiven their cold refusal of Italian demands for Corsica, Tunis and Djibouti. At an earlier date the same Fascist circles were further irritated by reports of the appearance of English warships in the Adriatic, looked upon by Italians as their inland sea. These same circles considered as a genuine provocation the passage in Churchill's speech where he declared that the English had managed to achieve their success in the North Sea without having to recall a single ship from the Mediterranean.

We think it probable that the cancellation of Mussolini's speech on April 20th was ordered because differences of opinion arose as to what should be said. It is no secret that in the relations between the Quirinal and the leader of the

Government repeated differences of opinion continue. Obviously the Quirinal has represented the peace party until now.

But this rift exists not only between the heads of the nation: it goes deeper. This is also admitted by official sources. Farinacci wrote briefly in the *Regime Fascista:* "Although the present era belongs to the cleverest, and the majority of the people want unity, yet there are professional grousers in drawing-rooms, in public meeting-places and in the surviving societies concerned with protecting people from the political measures of the régime, who give expression to their sympathy with the enemies of Germany." The appearance on the screen of British and German statesmen is always, as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* reports from Milan, booed by one section of the public, while the other applauds.

These are all only symptoms, but still symptoms, which show that the unity behind the façade of Fascism is by no means unconditional.

"Le Canard Enchainé" *Paris*

NAVAL STRATEGY

"Excuse me, you seem to have forgotten that I have just mined the entrance to the Skagerrak."

IN MAJORCA TO-DAY
Will Italy Occupy It Again?

by PAUL WERNER

From "Die Weltwoche," Zürich

THE harbour of Palma lies lonely and deserted to-day. Gone are the gay old fishing-boats which were a piece of the Mediterranean itself, gone are the luxury yachts, which represented the sophisticated world. Sad resignation dominates an almost forgotten island where once life bubbled over.

The people of Majorca have become timid and taciturn, as if they lived in constant danger. Only at midday and evening, strolling along the *Ramblas,* one sometimes still hears young girls laughing, and men talking loudly with animated gesticulations. Then one feels that, thank God, something is left of the old Spanish spirit.

* * * *

Palma was never "red." In its loyal belief in the nationalist unity of their Spanish Fatherland the people of Palma, right from the beginning, automatically reacted against the influence of the Popular Front. At the beginning of the Civil War Palma defended itself bravely against the attempts at invasion from nearby Barcelona. I still remember well that warm summer evening in August 1936, when I saw the sunburnt, defeated Red troops marching back along the *Ramblas* of Barcelona, after having failed in Majorca.

Palma was never Red. Cut off from the rest of Nationalist territory, it nevertheless maintained itself, faithfully trusting to final victory that would never have been possible if the whole population had not supported the Nationalist revolution. And yet, of this population, who were never Red, six thousand men and women are to-day imprisoned in Palma alone, a town with perhaps seventy thousand inhabitants in all. They are in prison, most of them, not for political crimes; ninety per cent of them are there merely because, at the time of the Republic, they held

State positions (two hundred school-teachers alone are awaiting trial), or because they have been convicted of "anti-religious" behaviour, i.e. because they did not go regularly, or did not go at all, to church. The Spanish Falange as champion of the Nationalist-Syndicalist revolution has been ousted here.

Prisons Are Full

I dashed from one prison to another, and found that they were, in fact, all full. The Spaniard is no criminal by nature, and there is little room in Palma for real convicts. The prisoners have therefore been put in a former timber store and in monasteries. It was not hard for the Church to give up some of its institutions for this purpose, since there are nearly four hundred churches and church institutions in Palma, and five more are being built at the moment. I did everything I could to secure information on this subject, and all I learnt was unpleasing. Even the fact that everything was being done to convert the prisoners did not impress me in the form it took: the prisoners are made to attend Mass three times a day.

All of a sudden numbers of soldiers have arrived in Palma. Almost all of them are from the provinces over on the mainland. A few days ago Spanish warships also put in an appearance, it was said, on a "short visit." It seems they have completely forgotten about leaving. So now we have a lot of soldiers and sailors who are all bored and don't know what to do with themselves. There would be nothing particularly remarkable about their presence, if it were not for the fact that the increase in their numbers happened to coincide with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway.

It seems they are not unreasonably putting two and two together in Madrid. And as they know their own friends best, they are doing it very cautiously and conscientiously. For there *are* people who know their way about this island a lot better than the Majorcans —and they are not Spaniards. They are also not French, although no one here doubts that France, after the experiences in the north, would try a breach of neutrality for once, for the sake of her route from the Motherland to North

Africa. People who see farther than the poor soldiers who lie around on the sand — not knowing quite what they are here for until they are told that it's time again for them to risk their lives—feel extremely uneasy. Something is in the air, and they would not be at all surprised if the hot sun one fine day shone down on new uniforms—uniforms which are well known here. Perhaps the very same people would come back, for it would, after all, be an advantage for them to know the hotel staffs and so save themselves a lot of bother. Instinctively, people here are convinced that Italy will come in on Germany's side; they are sure that Mussolini will try in this case to hand his declaration of war to the Allies in the form of an occupation of the Balearics.

That would probably be the biggest misfortune that could overtake Spain, for the whole country would, for obvious reasons, be involved in the war—not only on account of its attitude towards Gibraltar, but much more on account of the ore in northern Spain near Bilbao, and in the south near Huelva.

In Majorca they are fully aware of this threatening danger. A very clever Spaniard said to me the time had come when Spain would have to pay for the German-Italian armed help during the Civil War. True, he thought the moment might be postponed a while. And when I asked why, he replied: "Because Italy will not enter the war until Germany has proved that she is the stronger in the Balkans."

"Haagsche Post," Holland

"At last they've found a battlefield."

THE NORWEGIAN WAR
STRATEGISTS FOOLED

From "Der Angriff," Berlin, 27.4.40

It is well known that on the day Germany placed Norway under her protection, old Chamberlain made a blunder that will one day be entered in the history books as one of the most characteristic anecdotes about this man and his deeds. In fact, old Neville declared (in answer to an enquiry whether it was true that the Germans had taken Narvik) that he could only explain such foolish questions by the geographical ignorance of the questioner. Narvik lay in the far north of Norway, and could never be taken by the Germans. He must therefore be referring to Larvik, a little town on the southern coast of Norway.

Britain's Prime Minister must bitterly regret to-day that he answered his questioning colleague so rudely and accused him of geographical ignorance. Events have since shown that this man, in the responsible position conferred on him by His Britannic Majesty, displayed an astonishing ignorance of the strategical possibilities of modern warfare and, moreover, an equally surprising inability to estimate to the full the energy and skill of his opponent.

But in this, Old Man Chamberlain does not stand alone on the wide western European landscape. Whoever has the doubtful pleasure of reading the enemy Press, and certain like-thinking "neutral" papers as stupid as they are characterless, encounters the same Chamberlainite strategists at every turn. To be sure, meeting them turns the otherwise wearisome and boring perusal of these papers into real fun : one is saved the cost of the daily comic paper. At all events, we want to share with our readers this cheering part of our text by a few allusions to the main strategic ideas of these newspapers.

The *Basler Nationalzeitung* asserts, for example, that it was very foolish of the German papers to state that the occupation of Narvik had the object

of cutting England off from the Swedish ore supply. For the overseas raw material market remained at the disposal of the English. Unless, therefore, one supposes that German soldiers were making a little pleasure trip to the Arctic regions, nothing is left but to assume that the whole enterprise was completely senseless.

Now, however, during our perusal of *The Times* of 10th April—a paper which, it must be realised, is the official organ of the English Government—we read something that best refutes the Swiss *Nationalzeitung's* strategists. At that time *The Times* was obviously still of the opinion that, although the Germans had certainly reached Larvik, they were not at Narvik; because if they had reached Narvik it would surely mean, wrote *The Times,* that England was cut off not only from the supply of Swedish ore, but also from the invaluable molybdenum ore and acetylene alloys. This would cripple the English steel industry—thus *The Times,* not the *Angriff* — because the Swedish ore could not be replaced without further ado by overseas ore: the armament works, in fact, are entirely designed for and adapted to the peculiar composition of Swedish ore. Besides, England's aeroplane industry, through the lack of acetylene and molybdenum imports, and her shipbuilding industry, through the falling off in wood imports, would be seriously impeded. Always provided, of course, that the Germans ever succeeded in taking Narvik.

But let us return to the *Basler Nationalzeitung.* The paper carries its contradictory logic—which is simply due to its deep-rooted hate of all things German—so far that it contradicts itself. On April 17th it declares arrogantly that the German claim to have gained a victory in Norway would recall the declaration of the German General Staff after the Battle of the Marne, when it also stated that a great victory had been gained. On April 22nd, on the other hand, we read: "The occupation of the southern and south-western Norwegian ports would provide the German fighting forces with an excellent base against England. With every possible means, with constantly renewed supplies of men and material

from Denmark, the leaders of the German Army will try to strengthen their hold on these bases for operations against Scotland." Wisely, perhaps, no more was now said about Narvik. And the occupation of the southern and south-western Norwegian ports itself will be proved an indisputable fact to papers like the *Nationalzeitung* and its colleagues in other countries. We take pleasure in noting the bitter acknowledgment of that fact by the *Basler Nationalzeitung* when it writes: "But the Germans seem to accomplish the impossible with an extraordinary speed. . . . If they can transport two thousand men by air every day? And it seems as if they can. . . ."

Yes, they can; although it does not suit the *Basler Nationalzeitung*! In this war the Germans will achieve more impossibilities in other directions.

WAR AT ENGLAND'S DOOR

From "Rheinfront," Ludwigshafen, 16.4.40

With a great torrent of words English propaganda is trying to divert public attention from the threatening deterioration of the strategic situation of the British Isles, brought about by the German preventive action in the north. The military operations of the Western Powers are pursuing the same object. Through a strong concentration of superior sea-power at Narvik, the Norwegian port in the far north, a rapid success is to be secured under all circumstances; but this could neither affect the basic success of the German operations as a whole, nor could it even slightly change the strategic consequences for England.

Let us recapitulate once more the decisive elements in the new situation: it was the aim of German policy to forestall the plan, already in operation, of the Western Powers against Norway, and to prevent England from establishing herself on our flank in the north. This aim has been achieved. German troops, instead of English, occupy Denmark and the strategically important areas of Norway.

The projected threat to Germany's flank has been eliminated. By its nature and import the German action was a preventive measure for Denmark and Norway.

Now the English have relinquished those positions in Norway which have become indispensable for the war against England. All positions in Denmark and in southern and central Europe which are of any importance for the prosecution of the war are now firmly in German hands. These are the vital positions, that means that for England the war is brought very considerably nearer. Further, Churchill's forced action at Narvik in the north—indeed, even a local success there—upon which England now obviously depends for psychological reasons, cannot change the fact that the war has now moved nearer to the British Isles, and that Germany has taken up a flank position against England, and not vice versa, England against us.

Above all, the strategical possibilities opened up to the German Air Force will be obvious from the first glance at the map. It is this frightful, quite unexpected change in the situation that has struck at the heart of the English. Even the congratulatory telegram sent by Reynaud, who "quivered" with joy at the British naval action at Narvik, will not really be capable of comforting either Chamberlain or Churchill. The anxieties arising from this startling new strategic situation will not thereby be diminished for the Englishmen.

The same applies to the continued English efforts, with the aid of British agents and through certain pro-English circles in the former Government, to incite the Norwegian people to further opposition to German protection. King Haakon, who associated himself with a bitter anti-German appeal, for which he received telegrams of thanks from the heads of the State in England and France, was ill-advised when he consented to this campaign against Germany and the German Army.

The unscrupulousness of this campaign is evident from an appeal addressed to the Norwegians from the London wireless station by the former British military attaché. In this appeal, which is so strongly

reminiscent of the incitement of the population of Warsaw by the B.B.C., the Norwegian people are encouraged in their spying and sabotage. They must plunge themselves into further trouble for England and, following the example of Poland and Finland, "make their contribution," for which, as in these other instances, they will be assured that "prompt Allied help is coming." The truth is that England, exactly as in the case of Poland, has lost the game in the north, and even the desperate counter-attacks which Churchill undertook with his minefields at Narvik can no longer hide from the world that the war has moved to the doors of this England who wanted to threaten us from our northern flank.

Caught in a vice.

"Kansas City Star"

THE SWASTIKA OVER DENMARK

First Results of the Occupation

From "Neues Vorwärts," Paris

Following hard on the heels of the German invaders comes the spectre of famine. In Denmark, Norway and Holland cattle and other live stock are being slaughtered in appalling quantities, now that fodder from overseas is cut off. This picture of free Denmark under Nazi control is typical of their methods in occupied territories. In Norway, threats of death for sabotage or resistance by civilians are added to the terror

"WE'LL take Denmark by a telephone call when it suits us." For years this has been said in German Nazi circles. This cynical way of putting it reflected the true position. Denmark had no doubts about her relationship to Germany. With a certain fatalism she had awaited her conquest. Even if Denmark had prepared for defence, it would have made very little difference, except to provide a gratifying last act with fancy lighting and a heroic death for the spectator in the stalls.

Nevertheless, the conquest of Denmark was not made by telephone. On the contrary, Hitler sent in to the country exceptionally strong forces. The miniature Danish Army, which served only a decorative purpose, was disarmed, and German soldiers now keep guard before the King's Palace in Copenhagen. The Danish people reflect with bitter grief on the traditional friendship between Norway and Denmark. The Gestapo, who closely followed the army of occupation, see to it, however, that the Danes' feelings are not openly expressed. Arrests of German emigrants and Danish citizens were made immediately, and efforts to obtain their release by the still functioning Danish Government were unsuccessful.

The Gestapo forbade all public meetings and the listening-in to foreign radio

broadcasts. All telephonic, telegraphic and postal communications were put under their control, and archives and files belonging to the trade unions were confiscated. German representatives are now installed in all newspaper offices, and the Press and wireless are restricted to German sources for all their news. All cinemas are now showing German films.

German commissioners have been allocated to every Danish administrative body, and they give orders for confiscations and rationing. One of their first tasks has been to extend to Denmark the German system of utilising waste products. The Danish petrol reserve of two hundred and fifty thousand tons has been seized, railway traffic restricted, and the Germans allow private cars only on journeys which *they* consider important.

At the head of all these commissioners stands the former German envoy in Denmark—von Reuthe-Finck, who has been made special representative for Denmark by Hitler, and whose powers are somewhat similar to those of von Neurath in Prague. The military authorities are governed



"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris

IN THE FAR NORTH

"More traitors: they're using the morse code."

by a German Air Force general, Kaupisch.

According to the German Press the most important result of the occupation of Denmark will be the starving out of England. It is, of course, true that England drew a large part of her foodstuffs from Denmark—about one-half of her bacon imports, not quite one-quarter of her butter imports and about one-third of her eggs. Nevertheless, the cutting-off of these imports means, at the worst, a delay in the delivery of fresh supplies, and without doubt England will be able to replace these by purchases from other countries. That portion of the Danish mercantile marine acquired by Germany will not prove to be of very great service to her, as the English blockade and the severe shock given to the German Navy have left very few possibilities of overseas trade.

Danish provisions which formerly went to England now, of course, fall to Germany, but the Danish live-stock reserves will be reduced to a minimum, as no more cattle food can be imported. The Nazis have ordered the Danish Agricultural Ministry to replace oil-cake imports by linseed production in Denmark itself. Few milch cows are likely to be saved from an early death in the coming autumn and winter by this absurd demand. Apart from the strategical and internal political effects, the advantages of the occupation of Denmark for Germany are restricted to an increase of foodstuffs and provisions for a few months, and to the feeding of a part of the German Army through requisitioning. The prosecution of the war in Norway has also been made easier by using up the stocks of Danish petrol.

WHERE DOES STALIN STAND?

AGREEMENT OVER NORWAY

From the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung," Zürich

THE German attack on Denmark and Norway has been received in Russia with all signs of surprise. Frau Alexandra Kollentai, the Soviet Ambassadress in Stockholm, hurriedly assured the European public that Moscow was not informed of Germany's intentions, and that Russia would not deviate from her course of neutrality through the extension of the war to the Scandinavian Peninsula. A part of the European Press has pointed out that in fact Russia must be very worried by an action through which Germany will acquire Norwegian ports and the control of the Swedish iron ore. Further, the conclusion of this action will give Germany the balance of power in the Baltic, and thereby upset Russian illusions of safety, which the pacts with the Baltic countries and the "incident" with Finland had given them. The Soviet Government will again be forced to veer towards the Western Powers to protect itself from German ascendancy.

The French Press dismisses such considerations, and describes the apparent surprise in Moscow on the receipt of the news of the German invasion as hypocrisy. They are convinced in Paris that the occupation of Norway and the Russian war against Finland are part of a Russo-German plan for the division of the North, in which German domination of the Scandinavian Peninsula has long since been agreed to by the Soviet.

Actually, the Soviet Press (in which, incidentally, Frau Kollentai's declaration did not appear) has shown neither surprise nor disapproval of Germany's aggressive action. Rather it has associated itself with Germany's point of view—that the Reich acted in self-defence and was forced into invading Scandinavia through the British laying mines in Norwegian territorial waters. Moscow newspapers printed without critical comment the German memoranda handed over in Copenhagen and Oslo justify-

ing the German invasion. The Allies' war *communiqués* were pushed in the background, and the *Isvestia*'s leading article of April 11th, devoted to the "latest events in Scandinavia," was not backward in its reproaches addressed to the Western Powers. According to this writer, the Allies had plotted the Finnish war (which Russia had not wanted!) only with the aim of acquiring more favourable circumstances for fighting Germany, by overpowering Norway and Sweden "on the way" to Finland.

A large part of Molotov's speech in the Soviet Assembly was devoted to such jumbled and inaccurate invective. At that time it might have been imagined that Russia wished to soften the blow for Germany of her return to absolute neutrality. Now, it may be that the Kremlin only wishes to hide its own anxiety over Germany's expansion by expressing approval of the act of aggression and by indictment of the Allies. But this time the article in *Isvestia* does not allow of such suppositions.

The whole tenor of the article makes it plain that Russia cannot have been surprised by the turn of events. She not only ultimately blessed the expedition, but must have given Germany her consent to make the events possible at all.

Quite calmly the official Moscow journal substantiates the "fact" that not only Norway, but also Sweden, is now dependent on Germany, and that Swedish iron ore will be exploited by Germany only. The writer ends by asserting that one can only entirely agree with this "logic of war."

If the German Government really did undertake the occupation of Denmark and Norway without Moscow's knowledge, surely the reaction in the Soviet Press must have been different; surely some sign of the worry that Russia must have felt at the domination of the Baltic by Germany would have been apparent. The idea suggests itself that Germany offered some form of compensation in Moscow, by which Russian agreement to the extension of the war to the Scandinavian Peninsula was to be bought. It will probably soon be evident whether Finland will go on enjoying the independence granted her in the Peace of Moscow much

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longer. Meanwhile, we are of the opinion that no great compensation was demanded by Stalin to win his approval of the adventure in the North. Naturally it is quite clear to him what a final victory in Scandinavia and an unrestricted domination of the Baltic by Germany would mean for Russia sooner or later. But obviously he does not believe in a clear-cut German victory. In the Russian dictator's view the occupation of Norway, probably to be followed by that of Sweden, would so arouse the Western Powers that a stern struggle for mastery in the North might be expected to last for a long time.

Stalin's policy has indeed no other leitmotiv than the paralysing and wearing out of both the warring parties who might in the future threaten Russia — whether Germany or the Allies.

In Moscow there are no illusions regarding National-Socialist feelings towards Bolshevism. But did not Lord Halifax recently declare that Finland would be restored in her old form?

Probably Stalin regards the Allies as being stronger than Germany, and in the interests of Russia he believes he must drag them farther into the war. For that reason he may have sanctioned Nazi policy in the North. Accepting such suppositions, it is superfluous to inquire whether Russia would depart from her policy of neutrality and enter the war in the North to hinder a mighty German victory. The Allies have too much at stake to retire in the North and leave the field to Germany, and Stalin is certainly relying on this. He would certainly be extremely confused should Germany come out of the Northern war a clear victor; for his acceptance of the occupation of Norway and the understanding shown by the Press for Germany's control of the Northern productive centres leaves him no possibility of disputing their claim in those districts. If, however, Russia does not count on a German victory, and is satisfied with her own "neutral pose," it is questionable whether she will be able to maintain her neutrality should the British defeat the German army of occupation in Norway more quickly than Stalin

thinks, and in their turn dominate Scandinavia.

The moment to abandon Hitler and join the democracies has probably already gone, and it is uncertain whether the Allies, if they do get the upper hand, would even accept the assistance of the Soviets. Any help by Russia would in fact represent a capitulation of Bolshevism before victorious democracy, and therefore Stalin is likely to strive against it to the very last. We regard it as being more likely that he will attempt to achieve a "livening-up" of the war, and a balance of forces in the North by intervention on the side of Germany, so that the fighting there can be brought to an end — as far as possible without victors or vanquished.

"Le Canard Enchainé"

A.R.P. BEGINS AT HOME

BALKAN SLAVS EYE MOSCOW

by HENRI DE KERILLIS

In "L'Epoque," Paris

In the brief interval between the wars in Norway and the West, it seemed possible that Stalin had been dismayed by the overwhelming success of his German partner and might be inclined to offset his gains by concluding pacts with the Slav nations of the Balkans. At the time of going to press, the development has gone to the extent of a trade pact with Yugoslavia, and hints of a political agreement with this threatened country. This well-known French publicist, with anything but Bolshevik sympathies, urges a quick attempt at rapprochement *between the Allies and Moscow*

THE situation which is developing at the moment between Moscow, Berlin, Rome, Sofia, Belgrade, Budapest and Ankara is a thousand times more important for the future of the war than our miscalculations in Norway.

The following telegram appeared in the *Petit Journal* of May 3rd: "Sofia, 2nd May. The Bulgaro-Soviet Convention was approved by the Chamber this afternoon. Sotir Yanev, a Deputy who is a member of the Majority Party, warmly congratulated the Government on having re-established diplomatic relations with Russia, and affirmed that Russia had kept her promise not to intervene in Bulgaria's internal affairs. The speaker concluded by saying that neutrality was a mere fiction, and that it might be threatened any day, but he was convinced that in case of danger Bulgaria could rely upon both political and military aid from Russia."

Havas sends from Bucarest: "The negotiations between Yugoslavia and Russia are continuing. Russia pretends that she has nothing in view except an agreement on economic subjects. But it seems clear that in pressing for the opening of these conversations immediately after the Hitler-Mussolini interview on the Brenner, she must be actuated by political

considerations. It is known that the Italian spokesmen refused to collaborate with the U.S.S.R., and now, under cover of economic conversations, the latter is seeking a political advantage which will force Italy to reconsider her attitude."

Another *Havas* telegram comes from Budapest: "Russian influence appears to be increasing in this part of Europe. Hungary is said by well-informed observers to be on the point of opening economic conversations with Russia. If this is true, Russia may play the same decisive part in the maintenance of peace in the South-East as she has played already in keeping Sweden out of the conflict and in getting the Reich to respect Swedish neutrality."

This is not all. The great Dutch Catholic paper, *Maasbode,* has just published an extremely important article which is reproduced in the *Bulletin des Informations du Ministère de la Propagande.* It contains the following passages: "The attitude of Russia is even more enigmatic than that of Italy. One point alone is certain: the initial successes of the Germans in Norway have strengthened the German-Italian Axis and have at the same time alienated Russia and the Reich. It was said last week in quarters which are usually well informed that Russia told Germany that she would consider any action against Sweden as an unfriendly act, and that she would not tolerate German occupation of the Aaland Islands."

If this information is accurate, it means that the time has come for a reconsideration of the whole question of Russian relations with Germany and with the Allies. Those of us who study the signs of the times in the interest of France must admit that there is abundant evidence of a change in the climate of European opinion.

It is surely of great significance that Hungary and Yugoslavia, among other countries, are turning towards Moscow and beginning to negotiate with her. A fundamental change of policy is being accomplished at Belgrade under pressure of the German-Italian menace. No Government in Europe has more loudly ex-

pressed its horror of the Soviet. But the time has come when a change of attitude is necessary for the safety of the State. To take on Germany and Russia at the same time would be a hopeless task : to play upon the German - Russian antagonism, and to lean towards Russia, in hopes of thus resisting the principal enemy, is the course dictated by common sense and political logic.

German propaganda has, moreover, been wonderfully well served by the criminal folly of the Russians, who put into every country a Muscovite faction which is too weak to start a revolution, but which is yet obvious enough and strong enough to arouse the fear and hate of the population. This fear and hate Germany makes a point of exploiting.

Hitler's Moscow Friends

Nor has Hitler been satisfied with dulling the public intelligence or with recruiting experts in London and Paris to sabotage all attempts at *rapprochement* between the Western Powers and Russia. He has powerful allies in Russia itself.

There are elements even in the heart of Communism which, because of anti-Semitic and other tendencies, are openly sympathetic to the Hitler creed. Luckily, since the end of the Finnish campaign, military circles have regained their authority. There the old Imperial traditions still linger, mingled confusedly with the Communist ideology. They, too, have supporters in the Kremlin. It is obvious that a country which has been struggling for centuries against the Ottoman and Austrian empires for the hegemony of Eastern Europe is not going to watch with complete satisfaction her historic ambition ending in the profit of Germany and Italy.

Hold the Balkans

Now is the time for French and English diplomacy to get to work. If Russia and Turkey really take in hand the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, the situation will immediately be changed in our favour. Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey together can muster over a hundred divisions. They abut upon seas of which Turkey, England and France have complete command. An enormous barricade could quickly be formed against the aggressive Powers.

NAZI PARACHUTISTS DESCEND

A certain number of Hitlers have been taken.



"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris

FROM INSIDE GERMANY

ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY

Advantage from Allied Defeat

From the "Neues Wiener Tagblatt," Vienna, 26.4.40

No attempt to make far-reaching analogies between the relationship of the United States and England during the World War and now can get over the fact that the community of economic interests no longer exists which enabled British propaganda last time to overcome the will-to-neutrality of the American nation. In this connection a number of economic defeats suffered by the United States in several fields weigh decisively in the balance. To name one instance: England has victoriously pushed forward on the copper market, ousted American influence from the African copper mines, and forced American production to restrict itself almost entirely to the home market, which means that U.S. copper has become almost a negligible factor in the world market. The tin market is to-day controlled by England even more strictly than the copper market. In this field also, all attempts by the U.S.A. to gain influence in the tin cartel by means of increased participation in the Bolivian mines have failed. In this field England's dictatorship has been found particularly irksome; the United States, with no home production of tin whatever, requires nearly a third of the world output. The tin cartel, which is under English influence, has only recently increased the quota of production, in spite of the considerable shortage of tin in England; it has refrained from doing so before in order to raise the price, and so increase the amount of dollars obtained from the sale of the commodity in the United States. This unscrupulous policy led to lively protests from the American Government.

A similar situation exists as regards the Anglo-Dutch rubber monopoly. In order not to be entirely at its mercy, the U.S.A. have for a long time been try-

ing to secure an alteration in the regulation of the cartel covenant which forbids the export of rubber trees from the controlled territories to countries which are not powerfully represented in the cartel. On the English side, the abolition of this regulation has often been discussed, but it has never yet been carried out.

These and other similar annoyances have created a completely different background for future co-operation between the two Anglo-Saxon great Powers, compared with the World War. English attempts to drag the U.S.A. into their sphere of interest are therefore meeting with much more difficulty now than then, in spite of emphasis on ideological affinities.

In addition to these static economic points of conflict, various disturbances in economic accord have cropped up in the course of the European war. They are due in the first place to England's purchasing policy, which is in no way based on friendly consideration for the United States. This policy, particularly recently, has taken more the form of a daring diplomatic gamble than loyal co-operation between two mutual trusting business partners. England has been proceeding ruthlessly, applying pressure at every spot where the economic structure of the U.S.A. shows signs of weakness.

England's purchasing policy is based on the following principles: (1) The foreign exchange which the Western Powers acquire through gold exports and through the liquidation of securities in America is to be used exclusively for paying for war materials and for financing any Allied armament factories which may be established in the U.S.A.; and (2) non-war goods such as agricultural machinery, motor cars, etc., bought from America are to be paid for exclusively by the proceeds of British exports or services. This latter principle in particular has as consequence that American peacetime exports are suffering considerably, and this reduction is by no means being compensated for by the arms orders. For example, the export of American agricultural machinery has dropped by sixty per cent; wheat exports

during the first three months of the war fell from twenty million to eleven million bushels, as the English covered their requirements in the Argentine by barter, and were thus able to compete more strongly with the U.S.A. in industrial exports to South America. It is true that exports of American cotton rose at the beginning by thirty to forty per cent, but only a short time ago the English representative at the Cotton Conference declared that England must restrict her purchases considerably owing to shortage of foreign exchange. It is therefore expected that England in the current harvest year will not import so much cotton as in 1938-39, a year which was one of very poor business with England.

Very much to the astonishment of the American Ministry of Agriculture, the English are showing no interest in American dried fruits and vegetables, nor in American pigs, of which America had an embarrassing surplus this year. The export of tobacco to England has as good as ceased. The tobacco growers of Virginia and North Carolina view the future with great anxiety.

England's object in pursuing this very unfriendly policy is unmistakable. She aims at bringing America to accept without a murmur the dumping of British goods by means of the devalued pound without applying the dumping provision of the American tariff. In addition, England is striving to bring about an alteration in the Neutrality and Johnson Acts, in order that American credits may be granted to the Western Powers, at least for the purchase of non-war products.

Political Consequences

The situation described here shows clearly that the economic relationship of the United States and England in 1940 is basically different from that of twenty-five years ago. At present all the factors are absent which caused the Americans during the World War to regard the victory of the Western Powers as an economic necessity for the United States. Discussions about a defeat of the Western Powers in the U.S.A. to-day have no longer a defeatist character. The business world is discussing more and more openly the question whether an Allied defeat would not be to

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the advantage of the United States. The question whether they are England's heirs or are to keep her seat warm for the future has become the problem of the moment for America.

NAZIS PROTECT ANIMALS

"National Socialism and Protection of Animals" is the title of an article in the "Völkischer Beobachter" (Vienna), by Karl Hans Strobl, a well-known author who has enriched German literature with a number of spicy novels unconcerned with either National Socialism or protection of animals. Here is a note on the article.

"We protect a horse tortured by a cruel whip, not because we want its service for ourselves or others, but because, owing as we do allegiance to an abiding world-righteousness, we cannot tolerate the unjust treatment of any of God's creations. Any such deed of protection of otherwise defenceless creatures adds something to our inner being, enriches us in the very depths of our personality, and in this way eventually benefits us, albeit in a higher sense."

The author wishes to distinguish carefully between this "higher and purer" interpretation of Nazi protection of animals, and what he terms "the point of view of utility." He disdains the materialistic idea dividing the world into two halves—what is useful to man and what is harmful. According to this idea, by protecting animals we advantage men, i.e. we are acting from self-seeking motives. But National Socialism is one great challenge to every kind of exploitation and materialism. The belief in matter, in gain and profit — indeed, in one's own ends, is the enemy for whom there is no room in the new *Weltanschauung.*

This "new *Weltanschauung,*" Herr Strobl does not fail to point out, is, at least in this respect, greatly superior to the old *Weltanschauung* — Christianity: "The religion of Compassion and Charity has excluded the animal, our dumb brethren, from the highest possessions the human soul can bestow. . . . The Church drew a clear-cut distinction between man and animal; man alone shall have a share in redemption; no Saviour has risen for the animal."

GERMAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS

From the "Danziger Vorposten," 30.4.40

TWENTY-THREE German war correspondents have met their death at the hands of the enemy.

Since the outbreak of war the English and French Press has constantly shown considerable surprise that the names of fallen war correspondents are included in the casualty lists in the German newspapers. They have recognised with apparent astonishment the fact that German propaganda, so reviled by them, has from the first day of the war advocated and put into practice the principle that no one should report on the deeds and achievements of the soldiers at the front who is not himself exposed to the same conditions and dangers as every other man in the forward line.

The German people have above all followed with deep sympathy the accomplishments of the newsreel men, who, first in the Polish campaign and now in Norway, have achieved the technical and propagandist miracle of enabling a nation of eighty millions to see pictures of these historic happenings only a few days after they took place, and moreover, pictures that are technically and artistically far superior to the newsreels of the enemy.

Through the courage of the propaganda unit, an aspect of the Great War has been overcome which at the time deeply embittered the soldiers at the front: namely, that Jewish scribes, from their safe homes, encouraged them to glorious deeds, while they themselves, far from the gunfire, were already planning treason.

The National Socialist German Workers' Party has divested political propaganda of its former evil reputation, and has made it an indispensable factor in the modern leadership of a nation. The lying fantasies of a Churchill are in direct opposition to the concise sentences of the German war *communiqués,* which in their stern, soldierly language have always been accurate.

AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC OR HAPSBURG KINGDOM?

by HENRI HAUSER
Professor at the Sorbonne

In "Europe Nouvelle," Paris, 25-4-40

In an article in *Le Temps* of April 25th, M. Vladimir d'Ormesson develops the plea for the restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy which he had already made in the same paper on March 23rd. His advocacy differs from the lucubrations of some of the others who have supported the same cause, in that he does advance definite arguments in favour of it.

M. d'Ormesson's main point is that the Hapsburgs have tradition on their side. But that is precisely where the danger lies. We really cannot expect the Czechs, the Moravians and the Slovaks, or the Galician Poles, or the Croats, or the Transylvanians, or the Dalmatians, or the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians to go back to being subjects of a government which sits at Vienna. Further, it is impossible for the bearer of the Hapsburg name not to be considered, rightly or wrongly, as inheriting the traditional policy of his House: the subservience of the non-Germanic subjects of the ancient Austria. Even Italy, one of the successor States, would not tolerate it, and it is not necessary to be very subtle in order to understand that.

What was the significance of the word "Hapsburg" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? M. d'Ormesson claims that it meant "anti-Prussian." I suspect he is seeing the truth of history through the rainbow of diplomatic traditions. I know these traditions have often and for long periods dominated the Quai d'Orsay. I recollect a comminatory telegram which, had it been given to M. Benes, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in October 1921, when the last of the crowned Hapsburgs made his futile expedition, would have rendered impossible the creation of that Czechoslovak

bastion which made for our security until the criminal folly of 1938 destroyed it. Luckily, in October 1921, our military mission had a word to say in the matter: it called for mobilisation. That day I was in the office of the French general commanding the Bratislava Division, and I remember how delighted he was to see the Slovaks responding as eagerly as the Czechs themselves to the mobilisation order. Would they have agreed to being put back under the Hapsburg yoke?

What are the facts about this monarchy whose restoration we are in danger of seeing? M. d'Ormesson admits "the grave mistakes which accumulated during the unhappy reign of Francis Joseph." Which means, since this reign goes back to 1848, that since the failure of the Metternich system — without, for the moment, going farther back— the Hapsburg dynasty had ceased to represent a stabilising and peaceful influence in Europe.

We are told that its "European mission" was to be the antithesis of Prussia. Its official name was "Austria-Hungary." But we know that since 1867 at least it was really "Hungary-Austria"; that is to say that the head partner, the one at Budapest, had appropriated the right to dominate and to oppress the non-Magyar majority of Transleithania.* At the same time it guaranteed to the German bureaucracy of Vienna, which also represented a minority, the right to govern, and to govern by German methods, the non-German peoples—that is, the majority of the Cisleithan population. Now, this agreement for the domination of two majorities by minorities could not function except with the help of Bismarck's Germany, which, after Sadowa, had no desire to mutilate its victim. This is the explanation of the Double Monarchy, from d'Andrassy to Arenthal.

And now we are invited to see in Hapsburg Austria a rampart against pan-germanism. I can only say, "Don't be funny!" It was, on the contrary, in pre-war Austria that pan-germanism chiefly flourished; it was more at home

** The River Leitha was the border between Austria and Hungary—hence this term.*

there than in Germany itself. And it is true that the doctrines which afterwards deveeloped into Nazism were first hatched out there. Does my memory deceive me when I see in a Viennese Burgomaster, Doctor Lueger, one of the authentic ancestors of Hitlerian anti-Semitism?

The author of *Mein Kampf* is unjust when he fails to recognise his debt to the older Austria. It may be objected that neither the Hapsburgs nor the Austrian aristocracy shared the prejudices of Lueger: they had their Jews—and also their Jewesses. I agree, but it was from Vienna that the virus passed to Munich. To sum up, we have been apt to be several years behind the times in our ideas of Austria, and also of Germany; do not let us make that mistake again.

The usefulness of an independent Austria is obvious, but it need not be a monarchial or a Hapsburg Austria.

The makers of the Peace Treaty of 1919 have been reproached for having created an Austria which was incapable of sustaining a healthy economic life. An inquiry into the subject, when Austria appealed to the League of Nations, was carried out by two experts whose competence was unquestionable—our compatriot, Charles Rist, and an Englishman, Walter Layton. What were their conclusions? That Austria, as she was constituted by the Peace Treaty, was perfectly viable, on one condition. That condition was that she should work; and this was exactly what she objected to doing, being accustomed to living upon the labour of the other peoples united under the monarchy.

The Social-Democrats

There was another condition also, which was that she should profit by the blessed clause in the treaty which permitted her to make customs agreements with the successor States. Whose fault was it that she refused to accept the economic "compromise" which was several times offered her by Prague? Was it entirely the fault of the Austrian Socialists? I have a vague impression that Monseigneur Seipel, that favourite of Occidental governments, had a good deal of responsibility in the matter.

Were the Austrian Social-Democrats the culprits over the *Anschluss*? It is true that in 1918-19, having confidence in the Weimar Republic, they did have dreams of uniting themselves with it. I recall discussions which I had with some of them. I said: "I could understand your wanting union with a federal and republican Germany which would leave Austria her autonomy and her culture. But is that the Germany which really exists?" The Viennese Social-Democrats saw clearly in the end. I was in Vienna just before the Hitler revolution. All the Left papers, and those which had wanted the *Anschluss,* had great headlines saying: "We don't want to be a part of that Germany at any price." The clamour was unanimous.

They had become the greatest enemies of the *Anschluss* because they saw in Nazi Germany the antithesis of everything they cherished. Unfortunately, the Party is practically confined to Vienna, and the Federal Government used against them the provinces of Tyrol, Innsbruck and Salzburg, which are still attached to the reactionary ideals of the old Austria.

I do not wish to speak ill of anyone, especially of the dead, and the Nazis have made a martyr of Dollfuss. Peace to his ashes! All the same, I cannot forget with what brutality he stamped out the Viennese Socialists, and on what a dishonest pretext, pretending that the admirable workmen's dwellings, which might have served as models to all the rest of Europe, were fortresses prepared for civil war. In strangling the Viennese democracy he killed the one force in Austria which was capable of resisting Hitler. He died the victim of this mistake. And when, at the last moment, his successor appealed to the Austrian working class, his rallying cry resounded in the void. They had been broken.

M. d'Ormesson may desire to see Austria placed once more under the rule of the dynasty against which the peoples whom it oppressed have revolted, and against which they would revolt again. It is possible, apart from all sectarian ideologies, to imagine another solution.

CZECHS REJECT HAPSBURGS

by MATTHEW SPINKA
Leader of Czech Political Activities in the United States

From the "Christian Century," U.S.A.

A YOUNG man of 28, handsome, dark, with wavy hair, has just arrived in America. He is a scion of an ancient family, members of which have been ruling princes — even Emperors — for seven centuries. Archduke Otto of Hapsburg, the pretender to the Austro - Hungarian throne, is not coming to America merely for pleasure.

His visit has been planned far in advance, for his younger brother, the Archduke Felix, has been acting as his advance agent throughout the United States and Canada. Thus, in December 1939, Archduke Felix delivered a remarkable address in Chicago.

In a fervent and well-delivered speech he advocated nothing less than a democratic federation of the Danubian States—Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Repeatedly he stressed the idea that such a federation must come as a result of the free choice of the peoples involved, not by force. Nevertheless, he pointed out that such a choice would be so highly advantageous to these peoples that, were they to decline it, the refusal would brand the recalcitrant group as wilfully perverse.

Economically, the federation would comprise approximately the same group of nations as made up the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, although it would not be as extensive. Trade and customs barriers would be removed, and the three countries would find a ready market for their particular products. The new arrangement could not but result in prosperity and economic stability, which is the foundation of any permanent national development.

But mere economic federation, the Archduke continued, is not enough. The Little Entente was something of an economic federation—or so he chose to picture it—but at the first blow of the Nazis it fell to

pieces. It follows, therefore, that a political federation, in addition to an economic union, is highly desirable. The ideal to be followed would be the Federal Union of the United States under its Constitution. Moreover, each constituent group would retain its language, culture and autonomous administration.

This political federation, the Archduke assured his listeners, would lead to what he called a social union, and further the ideals of democracy, liberty and justice. To those familiar with the history of Central Europe, this was a most notable, even a startling, speech from a scion of the ancient house of Hapsburg.

Such a union as the ld Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy did not realise the aspirations Archduke Felix enumerated. It placed the preponderance of power—political and economic — in the hands of the Austrian Germans and the Magyars, while the most numerous element in the empire, comprising the various Slavic peoples, the Czechs and Slovaks among others, found themselves in a situation they rightfully regarded as a denial of political and economic freedom.

Had the Slavic element been given equal privileges with the Austrian Germans and the Magyars, or, in other words, had the dual monarchy been converted into a triple monarchy, the break-up of Austria could have been avoided. But even during the Great War the Emperor Francis Joseph stubbornly refused any concessions and drove the Czechs into revolt.

In the Danubian federation proposed by Archduke Felix the first objection which immediately presents itself is that after all Hungary is a monarchy, not a republic. Admiral Horthy is a regent governing on behalf of a king who is to be placed on the Hungarian throne as soon as circumstances permit. One of the candidates for this throne, and undoubtedly the chief candidate, is Archduke Otto, the brother of the proponent of the Danubian federation, Archduke Felix. The latter very cleverly omitted any reference to this fact.

It must be remembered that Hungary is among the last feudal States in Europe, where

the noble class not only possesses vast holdings of land, and thus exercises semi - feudal power over the common people, but concentrates in its hands practically all political authority. Can a State of this sort become a partner in a democratic Danubian federation?

Since the Archduke made no explicit statements to the effect that his brother is willing to abandon his claims to the Hungarian throne in favour of some democratic Danubian federation, one wonders whether the Archduke is really speaking on behalf of the Austrian democracy or only for the monarchic elements within Austria.

If Felix's advocacy of the democratic Danubian federation is really nothing more than a ruse to promote the restoration of the Hapsburgs to their ancient throne, then the Czechoslovak people without any doubt will respond with a polite but emphatic "No, thank you!" To them, that rule stands for national slavery.

Would not this ostensibly democratic union of States ultimately be dominated by the house of Austria, reinstated on the throne of Hungary? Would not an attempt be made to regain the possession of the thrones of Austria and Czechoslovakia? What guarantees does the Archduke offer that such is not actually the intention of the scheme which he advocates under the attractive-looking aspect of a federation of the democracies?

If the Magyars wish to restore Otto to their throne, well and good. If the Austrians desire the glorious house of Hapsburg to be restored to the Schoenbrunn Palace, they too are quite welcome to do so. But it is a moral certainty that the Czechoslovak people would never voluntarily place another king at the head of their State.

They fought for a democratic freedom; they won it; they made a brilliant success of it during the short period of their free Statehood, and it was by a wholly unjustified deed of spoliation that they are deprived of it at present. No form of federation which would endanger the fundamental democratic form of government, and which would not guarantee social and economic justice, would prove acceptable to them.

WILL AMERICA FIGHT JAPAN?
The Importance of the Philippines

by H. C. STEINMETZ

From "The Philippine Magazine," Manila

We have just listened to a radio debate between Paul V. McNutt and Nicholas Roosevelt on "Should We Stay in the Philippines?" A large proportion of the American public listened, for the occasion was the popular Thursday night Town Hall Meeting of the Air. Special interrogator was Dr. Raymond Lesley Buell of the Foreign Policy Association and *Fortune Magazine.* It would be flattering to readers in the Philippines to report enthusiastic interest, penetrating questions from the audience, and evidence that the American public mind is unifying behind clear and noble international policy which can relieve the Filipino and Philippine American of all worry; but the situation is quite otherwise. It is more significant to report that Messrs. McNutt *and* Buell won the debate.

The question, to Mr. McNutt, is tantamount to asking if we are willing to withdraw from the Orient, to sacrifice our policies of the Open Door in China, the integrity of China, and the freedom of the seas and the air. Stripped of famous McNutt political embellishments, two allusions were outstanding: to "1,200 miles of strategically situated islands averaging about 500 miles from the Asiatic mainland"; and to the Philippines being Uncle Sam's "fifth best customer in 1939 and a cash customer at that." These economic facts are not unrelated to the advantage that retention of the Philippines would give the United States in arbitrating difficulties on the Asiatic mainland.

While McNutt thus looked to the future, Nicholas Roosevelt dwelt almost entirely upon the error of promising independence to the Filipinos in the first place and the advantage, in security and peace, for the United States, of now keeping that promise. "Filipino politicians made their independence bed; let them lie in it." We

cannot afford to carry responsibility for a situation in which we have inadequate authority. Defence of the Islands will embroil us with Japan; let's pull out, lock, stock and barrel. The next thing one knows we'll be called upon to protect the French, British and Dutch in the Orient, too. Seriously, why wait until 1946; why not plan to get free from all entanglement by 1942? Mr. Roosevelt is now special editorial writer for the New York *Herald-Tribune*.

Mr. Buell made vigorous objection to the injustice of our insistence upon free trade in the Islands while, under existing terms of separation, Philippine goods are gradually quota-ed out of the American market. He mentioned the need for granting the Japanese fair trade rights in the Islands in the course of interceding for China. Mr. Buell believed that our adroit State Department manœuvres with Japan require a strong position in the Philippines; otherwise we invite a Munich or Czechoslovakian sell-out. Mr. Roosevelt, however, holds that we should pull out or prepare frankly for war.

It is obvious that the debate was neither lively nor particularly instructive. Perhaps we may be permitted a little speculation ourselves.

The United States will play all roles, and is preparing, by force if need be, to render its traditional policies consistent. Toward Japan a period of dalliance is drawing to a close. Toward Russia a period of active enmity is probably beginning. One of these will be played against the other. But by and large, and according to the exigencies of pure opportunism, the United States will play a strong, independent hand.

With Japanese - American trade relations on a day-to-day basis, the most pointed debate among the informed these days is over embargoing materials of war to Japan. Thus we have just listened to another radio programme, a spontaneous discussion over the Columbia system in the home in New York of Lyman Bryson, CBS adult education director, between Major Evans Carlson, Eliot Janeway and two other authorities. There was substantial agreement on the need for stopping Japanese aggression, but difference as to whether an

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embargo should be mandatory and congressional or, on the other hand, optional and presidential.

Since without materials purchased in America, Japan cannot, it is said, continue its war in China, war over the issue would seem unlikely or suicidal for Japan. On the other hand, the lengths to which Japanese generals are willing to go is



"North China Herald" *Shanghai*

unknown, and Japan is said to have accumulated a year's supply of war essentials. It may be (1) that we shall have to sink about half the Japanese fleet.

This is not a preferred solution to the situation, but for a vast number of reasons it is likely to be forced upon us. The powers-that-be in this country would greatly prefer that the Soviet Union and Japan tangle immediately; and I dare say that this fond hope has lain back of our persistent provisioning of Japan with its major raw materials of war during the last few years. The main difficulties in the way of continuing this lucrative trade are (*a*) Japan's stubborn aggression against China without reliable evidence of taking on the Bolsheviks seriously, indeed (*b*) the danger of a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Japan at the expense of Britain and France in the Orient; (*c*) steady increase in American indignation over this bloody trade with Japan; (*d*) we need to start accumulating a few more reserves ourselves, and (*e*) Japan's credit is short-term now.

During the last year Pacific fortifications, distribution of provisions and range of manœuvres, and now the recruiting and training, aircraft construction and propaganda, all indicate readying for war in the Pacific area. The country is still chuckling over Admiral Harry E. Yarnell's recent slip from the subjunctive mood in a national broadcast on Oriental problems; he said, or said in effect: "No troops will be landed; *it will be* purely a naval war." The lately retired chief of our Asiatic Fleet should know.

Save for the Kiaochow-Tsingtao area, Japan must stay north of the Great Wall.

(2) During the war excitement and fear in the Islands, the Philippine legislature will vote frantically to rescind the independence commitment in favour of dominion status. Other islands may, through war or purchase, fall into our hands; it would be particularly profitable, for example, to protect British and French possessions at the expense of the Dutch. Anyway, Uncle Sam seems due to slip bashfully into the shoes of Mother England in the Orient. By that time the homeland may be pretty hard

hit, and Canada may be the headquarters of the English-speaking Union.

(3) Our promise to the Islands having been satisfied, and the titanic struggle between State and corporative enterprise in Europe still continuing, as it is bound to for a couple of generations, and Japan having been put into her place (off our sea and on the mainland facing west), the United States will be in strategic position to face the Soviets as the great protector of the Allies, the Pope, free enterprise, the Western Hemisphere and Christianity in the Orient.

The outlines of coming events are looming through the political fog of reaction that is enveloping the United States. Nicholas Roosevelt to the contrary notwithstanding, differences in foreign policy between the two political parties in America are negligible. Republican spokesmen are a little less bullish than bearish in expression, but they are not in office—nor likely to be. Young Dewey's advertised attack on President Roosevelt's foreign policy petered out with a fizzle over recognition of Russia in 1933. A Republican national columnist said the other night that among Republican leaders Mr. Hull, Secretary of State, is the most popular Democrat. While the major Republican candidates are manœuvring apathetically, criticism of President Roosevelt has virtually died away in the big Press. Only John L. Lewis, the great labour leader, strikes out at the chief; attack from the Left is likely to swell into a chorus during the next few months in an attempt to preclude Roosevelt's own or chosen candidacy at the Democratic convention. Vaguely it is being sensed that the issue before the American people is war, or a series of wars, or peace. At the moment we are declaiming for peace and preparing for war. Psychologically we withdraw from the war in Europe; and we are not quite ready for another expeditionary force against the Bolsheviks, despite terrific Finnish propaganda; but there is Japan, guilty as hell, and exposed. After Japan? One cannot tell. The Philippines will be in the bag again, anyway.

"Haagsche Post," Holland

"There might be good fishing in these troubled waters."

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INDIA TO-DAY

DOMINION STATUS IS NOT ENOUGH

A Federal Solution

From "The Statesman," Calcutta, 18.3.40

We have more than once said that we do not object to the refusal of the Congress to accept Dominion status as a proper political goal for India. Our reasons may not be their reasons, yet starting from that point of agreement and following a fresh line of thought more suited to the times we live in, we might end by agreement all along that new line.

For indeed we do not write as advocates. We write of what we think will happen whether any of us like it or not. And quite sincerely we think that after the present war Dominion status and the Statute of Westminster will alike be as dead as the dodo.

Equally the idea of independent armed sovereign States, each of them vainly attempting to make itself inviolable, will disappear, for the simple reason that no State can achieve it and that the world must find a means of preventing recurring wars.

As we see it, the future before India is something much better than Dominion status, and much better than an independence which in the nature of things can never be real, any more than the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Finland was real, or of China, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Rumania, Turkey, Switzerland, etc., is to-day real.

The independence of Britain and France, and countries in the Commonwealth such as South Africa and Australia, has also become unreal. With aggression abroad in Europe and in Asia, they can save themselves only by realising their dependence on one another and practically pooling their armaments and resources.

As we see it, therefore, the whole conception of Dominion

status — the right to remain neutral and the right to secede—will disappear, and be replaced by a Federal British Commonwealth.

Equality of Status

In such a Commonwealth the present indefinitely superior status of Great Britain, as the main source of foreign policy, will also disappear. Great Britain will have her own Government, but that Government will not control foreign policy. That will be in the hands of the federal Commonwealth Government, which will require a federal capital of its own; and Great Britain will, like India, South Africa, Australia and the rest, be one of the federating States.

Obviously that means that India will have real equality of status. Federal status is indeed far better than Dominion status. And for Britain and India and every other country federal status promises safety, whereas the pretence of independence points to destruction.

In this way India will bring her proper contribution to the further building up of a federal world order. She will be truly herself, a friendly nation in a friendly world.

Within herself she has vast cultural riches: Islamic, Hindu, Zoroastrian and Christian. The Indo-British connection in itself has been fruitful of much, and should enable India to provide a harmonious synthesis of Eastern and Western thought which may help in curing the ills of both Europe and Asia.

But if our judgment of the early course of evolution which the demonic destructiveness of modern war will inevitably produce is right, then the offer of Dominion status on the one hand and its rejection on the other have little meaning. Equally meaningless is the argument about the Constituent Assembly and all the rest of it.

Federate India First

The thing that stands out like the snowy Himalayas is that the immediate task is for Indian leaders to make the nation a reality by acting together and producing a Government which will in effect be the first federal Government. For till India itself is federated, there can be

no federal Commonwealth or federal world order. But along that path great problems will be simplified.

Take the question of paramountcy, for instance. Clearly in a federated British Commonwealth paramountcy could no longer be exercised by the British Parliament. It would pass in the first instance to the federal British Commonwealth Government, the organ of foreign policy. Whether it would then devolve upon the Indian federal Government or not would be a matter for settlement between the contracting parties. Paramountcy, we may hope, would eventually be liquidated altogether in federation, because the necessity for it would eventually disappear.

But that there will be a real clean-up in the world as the outcome of this war is a major probability. British India today unfortunately presents far less unity or claim to be a State than Gwalior or Bhopal. Pretence will not survive the shocks of world upheaval. Those who cannot get on



"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris

"There go those Swedes again, violating our neutrality by letting their country run under our aeroplanes."

"La Lumière," Paris

"I'm all for national union, provided they put all the socialists and the radicals in internment camps."

together will in the end have to get out. Depressed areas, whether in Eire, India or South America, if self-government fails and only passion rules, will be administered somehow.

Those who imagine the future as an orgy of self-determination in a passionately nationalistic world are, we think, suffering from a dangerous delusion. A clean-up will come; the motto is: "Clean up or be cleaned up."

GANDHI'S SOLUTION

"DOMINION status even of the Statute of Westminster variety cannot suit India's case," writes Mr. Gandhi in to-day's (March 16th) *Harijan*.

The article is in reply to a letter from "a very responsible Englishman to a common friend." The writer of the letter, who claims that his opinion is held pretty generally by a large number of Englishmen, asks what he is to make of the Patna resolution of the Congress, which appeared to be "a rather sudden and drastic change from a demand for Dominion status to one of complete independence."

Mr. Gandhi, explaining the Patna resolution, says that what Congress has asked for is Britain's declaration that it will give effect to the decisions of a duly elected constituent assembly. Such an assembly will not be synonymous with Congress, and the decision of that assembly may be Dominion status or it may be less than Dominion status. The Congress will not lower its flag.

"The resolution makes the Congress position clear beyond doubt. It represents also my own position. If the British Government really mean full-hearted Dominion status with the right to secede, then they can have no difficulty in accepting the Congress position.

"Unfortunately, Lord Zetland's statement in an interview to a newspaper shows that it is not India which is to determine her future, but that Britain will do so for her. This is not even Dominion status of any known variety.

"Once the British Govern-

ment are sure that they can no longer hold India, all the difficulties that are now being put forth on their behalf will vanish like darkness before dawn. For they are all of their creation. They are inherent in exploitation. I hope you now see that there is no question of distrust of the Viceroy. Events had to move to where they are."

Referring to the question of what will happen if Englishmen vacate the country, Mr. Gandhi says that this honest English belief in the incapacity of India to come to a sane judgment or to defend herself against civil war or foreign aggression is perhaps the greatest stumbling-block in the way of an honourable settlement.

"If the fear is justified, the only antidote is to run the risk and let India learn wisdom and the art of self-defence by becoming free. Any other course means almost perpetual helplessness and foreign domination.

"Surely it is better for India, England and the world that a helpless sub-continent runs the greatest risk for coming into its own that that in this sickness it becomes a dead-weight to itself and the world."

INDIA AND THE U.S.A.

From "Great Britain and the East," London

UPON one point Mr. Duff Cooper has been insistent in various speeches he has delivered in England since his return from America—that the activities of Hindu propagandists in the United States, flagrantly misrepresenting the conditions that exist in India, have had a powerful influence in hardening American opinion against the Allied cause. Since the number of these Hindu speakers is increasing, the harm that they do ought to be countered in one way or another.

The one way that is likely to be effective is to let America know the facts through the Press, by sending speakers to tour America who know India, and by the use of broadcasting. Hitherto the British Government has manifested the strongest reluctance to initiate

anything that could be regarded as propaganda in America. Can we longer deny ourselves the correction of misrepresentations that, in the absence of an answer, are being accepted as truth by many millions of American citizens?

Nothing, for instance, astonishes the average American citizen more than to be told that the provinces of British India have self - government over a wider field of social activity than that allowed to the individual American States, and that this self-government was, until Congress Ministries abandoned their posts, wholly in the hands of elected Indian legislators.

Astonishment is manifested that there was not, when war began, a single Englishman sitting in any Provincial Legislature as a Minister, that the overwhelming majority of the men serving in the permanent services of the Provinces are Indians, and that the disproportion between Indians and Englishmen in all but the highest service of the Central Government is almost as great.

Upon the judicial bench Indians outnumber Englishmen; in the highest court of all, that which will deal with federal appeals when Federation is established, an Englishman sits with two Indian colleagues.

The picture that has to be presented to the world is that of an India already so far advanced towards self-government that no impediment to Dominion status exists outside India itself. If progress has been interrupted, the break has come neither from action by the British Government nor from the failure of the Congress Ministries. It is due to the acceptance by Indians themselves in seven provinces of such a negation of democratic control as permits an outside body, responsible to no electorate, to dictate to the Congress legislators when they shall take office and when they shall resign.

In merest outline these are the truths that should be placed before the American people and the world outside the British Commonwealth.

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR

IS THIS AN IMPERIALIST WAR? By Professor Harold Laski. *Labour Party Pamphlet.* 2*d.*

Reviewed by "EX-SERVICEMAN"

THERE must be many men of my generation who wish they were young enough to go on active service again in this war as they did in the last. To the serving soldier, sailor, or airman, the problems of life assume a simplicity denied to even the most unthinking civilian. His but to do or die, and not to reason why. Such a life resembles in many respects that of the cloistered monk, as Lawrence of Arabia apparently realised. Civilians in war or peace are compelled to face a whole series of problems which the serviceman can put out of his mind with a clear conscience.

These somewhat obvious reflections came to my mind on reading a pamphlet by Professor Harold Laski entitled "Is This An Imperialist War?" published by the Labour Party. To my mind the only satisfying and straightforward statement in the whole argument is a quotation from Harry Pollitt on "How To Win The War," written on September 14th, 1939—and no doubt now repudiated by the author. This reads: "To stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only revolutionary-sounding phrases while the Fascist beasts ride rough-shod over Europe, would be a betrayal of everything our forebears have fought to achieve in the course of long years of struggle against capitalism." If the last two words were changed into "for freedom," I think any citizen of the United Kingdom could whole-heartedly accept Mr. Pollitt's words as a clear expression of his reasons for entering the war. But no such comfort is to be derived from Professor Laski's pamphlet, which is full of those "revolutionary - sounding phrases" which Mr. Pollitt condemns at this juncture. The unfortunate Socialists who are girding their loins for battle are told that they "must grasp in all its complexity the dual nature of the issue that confronts them.

Above all, they must understand that they cannot defeat Mr. Chamberlain and the things he represents save as they give all their energy to the defeat of Hitler." A more unsatisfactory basis on which to fight a war I cannot conceive. Surely party politics should be put in the background during a war, and the whole effort of the country concentrated upon winning the war without any reservations. By all means let criticism be directed to keeping the Government up to the mark in prosecuting the war and in assuring equality of sacrifice between all members of the community. But to fight with one eye on the enemy in front and the other on the enemy in the rear appears to me to be suicidal.

If the Labour Party can convince the country that their leaders are capable of bringing us to victory more quickly and effectively than Mr. Chamberlain and his present Cabinet, by all means let them do it. But if the Labour Party leaders adopt Professor Laski's dualism I should expect a German victory. Sir John Reith has recently told us that there should be no neutrals on the home front — and I would add no dualists either. Neither jargon nor jingoism will win this war, but only an all-embracing will and purpose to defeat the Germans. Nor, *pace* Professor Laski, should we be too soft to the Russians. No sensible man wants to add to the number of his enemies unnecessarily, but if Russia joins Germany in aggression we must treat her according to her acts, and not according to our sympathies for a theoretical Communist régime which has never in fact existed, and certainly does not exist in Russia to-day.

One of the greatest weaknesses in our post-war policy has been the whitewashing of the dictatorial régime in Russia under the guise of sympathy with Communist ideals. The failure of the Labour Party to condemn outspokenly the cruelty and lying associated with Russian Communism is a greater sin than the failure of the League to stand up to aggressors. Fascism and Nazism are merely copies of the worst aspects of Russian Communism, and these systems might never have arisen if Left Wing parties in Europe had from the

first condemned the cruelties of the Russian régime instead of condoning them, as the Dean of Canterbury still obstinately does to-day. If Communism can be initiated and accepted by a free democracy voluntarily, and established without tyranny, by all means let it come. But do not let us pretend that any system that is imposed and sustained by force and cruelty is better than private capitalism as practised in a free democracy.

The Allies' sole job now is to win the war; and the best service Professor Laski could give to the Labour Party would be to advocate action to that end without equivocation.

SELF-HELP IN GERMANY

THE GERMAN PEOPLE VERSUS HITLER. By Heinrich Fraenkel. *Allen & Unwin.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by OLGA KATZIN

GERMANY was the Nazis' first battleground; and, in the opinion of this author, whatever the outcome of the world conflict, it will be their last. Germany at the moment of the Nazi invasion was like a completely unsuspecting neutral (with, however, a rather high proportion of Quislings), fortified against internal aggression by the Constitution and the laws.

The Constitution literally and symbolically resided in the Reichstag, and the enemy from within "simply burned the Reichstag, and then accused their opponents of the crime and put them away, either in neat but large concentration camps, or in even neater but smaller urns"; and the country has gradually become aware that it has been seized by a gang of killers disguised as lawgivers, policemen, professors, philanthropists and social workers.

Mr. Fraenkel in his enlightening and completely factual study explodes the most widespread fallacy of all about the regime — that though it used and tricked the higher-ups, it has done a great deal for the people: he proves how the workers, craftsmen, peasants and small shopkeepers (the backbone of the Hitler movement) have all in turn been dispossessed and pressed into the service of the war machine. But just as the Fifth Column is used by Hitler abroad, so it acts against him at home.

German opposition has been going since 1933 with passive resistance, secret literature, whispering propaganda, newsletters and secret broadcasts; and it continues in "cells" in the factories, on the land, in the army, in the Church, in the universities and even in the party itself. Its numbers cannot be known, and its efforts at moral and physical sabotage are manifestly so far a failure, but it is obviously something Himmler finds it necessary to keep down with, literally, armies of storm troops. Here are items from his instructions to army officers in 1937: "In a future war we will have to deal not merely with the front of the army on land, on sea, and in the air . . . we will have a fourth battlefield to look after: inner Germany . . . the majority of political prisoners will have to be shot out of hand . . . the entire country must be occupied by a minimum of thirty Death's-head divisions."

The world is only now awaking to the exact nature of the force against which the underground German opposition has been struggling for seven years. Mr. Fraenkel contends that the Third Reich is not the offspring of revolution, but that revolution is to come, and will destroy it. His prediction in the present state of affairs sounds fantastic, but he has done a real service in giving us in this country the record of a brave struggle. In fairness, this struggle should be remembered; and in all future estimates it is only the fight of her decent and desperately courageous minority which will save her from complete condemnation.

THE OTHER WAR

WARNING LIGHTS OF ASIA. By Gerald Samson. *Hale.* 15*s.*

Reviewed by R. H. Hollis

Mr. Samson was in Tokyo on February 26th, 1936, when a group of junior officers and 1,400 men belonging to the world's most disciplined and patriotic army mutinied and ruthlessly assassinated statesmen and officials close to the Japanese throne. On the following day he was arrested. One may hazard the guess that the revolt was the excuse rather than the reason for his arrest, and that the authorities seized

the opportunity of the declaration of martial law to get rid of one who had already made a nuisance of himself, and had seen rather more of Japan and her possessions than was thought advisable. Mr. Samson clearly believes in seeing things for himself: both in China and in the Japanese empire he covered a tremendous amount of space. But the Japanese do not like people who see things for themselves: they believe in the personally-conducted tour and respectful attention to the words of the guide. And so Mr. Samson was deported to Shanghai as a spy. He rashly chose to visit Manchukuo. The spy story followed him, and he was deported again.

In both Japan and Manchukuo Mr. Samson saw much that is of great interest, but after he has forgotten the rest he will no doubt remember his treatment in Japanese gaols. So will his readers, for his descriptions of the appalling conditions are unforgettable.

Mr. Samson covered a great deal of ground in China, both in Government territory and in the occupied areas. In the far west he saw something of the Chinese Industrial Co-operative Movement, the organisation started by the young New Zealander, Mr. Rewi Alley, which may be the means by which Chiang Kai-shek will ultimately defeat the Japanese. When Mr. Samson wrote, the Co-operative Movement had over six hundred units in production.

The figures which Mr. Samson quotes of the new Chinese armies would be impressive if one could forget the terrible slaughter inflicted upon the earlier levies by Japanese mechanised units and guns. Chiang Kai-shek is said to have three and a half million trained regulars, and another five or

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six million who have received partial training. The manpower is there, and the spirit of the nation is unbroken. Their crying need, which is unlikely to be satisfied, is for modern equipment.

IS FRANCE STILL A DEMOCRACY? By D. M. W. P., *Fabian Society Pamphlet.* 1*s.*

Reviewed by A. RITCHIE

THIS pamphlet is an answer to English Labour and Liberal criticism of the extended powers of the French Government since the outbreak of war, and of the use which has been made of those powers. There have been three main subjects of criticism. The first is the institution of government by decree, and in particular the decrees restricting civil liberties and dealing with labour questions such as collective agreements, conciliation and arbitration, hours of work, etc. The second is the repression of Communism. The third is the treatment of the various classes of refugees now finding shelter in France. D. M. W. P. argues brilliantly for the defence, and his pamphlet should be in the hands of anybody who wishes to have the facts of a case which is too often presented in local Party colours. Lack of space forbids a résumé, however brief, of his thesis here, but in view of the desire for a close and fundamental sympathy between the French and British nations, we must mention as particularly valuable his insistence that knowledge of the French mentality and the French habits of life—the products of a different history and a different fate from our own—should be a preliminary to any criticism of French internal affairs. "It is not enough . . . to consider the facts alone. They do in the main give the lie to the accusations mentioned above, but the root of the misunderstanding lies much deeper. It lies in the British democrat's habit of looking at French problems through British spectacles. . . . The French are entitled to ask that before we criticise we shall try to shed something of our insularity, that we shall try to see democracy not as a British invention, but as a plastic concept taking on different forms in response to different needs."

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